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Introduct > on
The Reagan Administration s policy towards india was not a 
simplistic line encoded in some National Security Decision 
Directive iNSSD) but the NSSDs reflected an evolution of 
administrât ion thini ing as it responded to regional events as if 
debated priorities, as it 1 earned more about its own interests, and 
those of India and Fai-istan This policy thus evolved between 1981 
and 1988, with critical elements added in 1982-3 and 198^-6 Let us 
first loot at the assumptions and background of those who made 
American policy before turning to the evolution of the strategic 
principles on which that policy was based
The P Iayers
By the time the Reagan administrât ion filled the the various poiic/ 
positions in State, Defense, and tne White House some progress had 
already been made in rethinking American poi lev towards South Asia 
The Larter administration had second thoughts about its erratic 
nuclear policy it had already offered Fai istan a substantial dia 
paci age, and it had come to see the Soviet presence in Afghanistan 
as a serious threat to American interests But it had lost 
credibility FaFistan turned down the Carter otter of military and 
economic aid not because of the size of the program (which, on an 
annual basis was the same as that 1 ater offered by the Reagan 
administration), but because it wanted some assurance of long-term 
American support (Islamabad had concluded that the Soviets were 
uniíiel y to soon withdraw from Afghanistan— which was the Indian 
position at the time) The Fai istanis also wanted assurances 
against an Indian threat, but neither Carter nor Reagan were ever 
prepared to offer these
The bureaucrats, politicians, and political appointees who filled 
iey poi lev positions in 1981 were chiefly interested in containing 
Soviet influence With a few e ceptions they had virtually no 
regional e pertise, those that did were more familiar with Iran and 
the bulf Francis Fui uyama s famous RAND studies were not a 
blueprint for administrât ion policy but did reflect this central
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concern with Fai-ist an s role in the containment of Soviet aggression 
and the shat y American position in the bul f and Iran
Overal 1 American e pertise on India, and even on Fai istan was 
severely depleted In the 19LUs and 196<)5 there was a corps of 
regionally qualified FSGs military of-ficers, and other e perts 
they had superb language si ills and firsthand Inowledge of botn 
India and Fakistan and the region had attracted some of the best 
talent in Washington By 198<> much of this e pertise had vanished 
and South Asia had became something of a bureaucratic bad water
Ironically, this lad of regional e pertise had an adverse impact 
first on Fai istan There was no established Pal istan lobby in the 
bureaucracy— nor was there much concern over Fai istan in Congress, 
the press, or academia When the economic and military assistance 
agreements were finally concluded with Islamabad it fool several 
years before they began to operate properly Americans had 
forgotten how to deal with the Fai ìstani bureaucracy, fhe Faiìstanis 
had not received substantial amount of U 5 aid for twentv years 
For e ample, in 1981-2 there were misgivings in the Air Force over 
selling F-16s to Fai istan these were in short supplv, some thought 
that the Pal istanis could not properl y maintain or fly them and 
there were tears that a renegade Fakistam pilot would deliver one 
to the Russians
Later, in 198er, when the opening to India finally occurred the 
U S bureaucracy again had to learn how to deal with a new (and 
considerably more recaicitrant) set of bureaucratic partners The 
sale of high-technology to India met with especially severe 
resistance from obscure corners of the Fentagon This was not tor 
South Asian reasons but because India was the first non-al1 led 
developing state to receive such technology and it not only had 
close economic ties to the Soviet Union but openly boasted that it 
would be a conduit to the Soviets for Western technology (American 
computers, for e ample, are matched to Indian machine tools and 
sold, as a pad age, to the Russians) This is perfectly legal and
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per haps in American pubi íe and corporate interests Put it made the 
bureaucracy wary It also raised a new poiic/ issue l-f we were to 
sell quite advanced technology to India could we sell it to Falistan 
or the Feople s Republic o+ China-1 In some cases, the answer was 
no and India has received better terms than both o-f its rivals on 
certain items (especially computers and jet engine technology;
There were also regional stylistic factors that influenced the 
pace of change in American poi icy in South Asia The Indian and 
Faiìstani bureaucracies treated Americans in very different ways, 
and Americans, especially those not very familiar with the region, 
responded accordingly Congressmen bureaucrats, journalists, and 
politicians routinely received the red carpet treatment in 
Islamabad, and met with officials several grades above their own 
level (not infrequently, with Fresident Zia) This contrasted 
sharply with the cool, indifferent, and sometimes outright hostile 
treatment by New Delhi of Americans who were not certified triends 
of India (1 e uncritical supporters of New Delhi s policies; I 
personally enjoy the argumentative style, but have spent a number of 
hours trying to e plain it away to infuriated American officials, 
who had earl 1er been sympathetic to Indian interests I
Finally, a few additional factors should be mentioned tor they 
began to affect American policy towards South Asia (especially 
India) during this period and are 1 ilei y to grow in significance 
These counterbalanced, to some e<tent, the lac! of bureaucratic and 
political contacts between the U S and India and Fakistan
* I know of one case where, on a mere courtesy call, a senior Indian official 
casually mentioned to a cabinet-level American official that the Afghan problem 
would end if the US were to cease its support for the Mujahedin and Fak istan I 
am sure that there were similar horror stories on the Indian side A great deal 
of effort must have been spent putting out brushfires caused by ignorant or 
carel ess remarks
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The first was the enormous growth of personal , educational , 
economic, and cultural lints between the U S and both states 
While the American military bureaucracíes had had no real contact 
with India, most of the corporations interested in selling advanced 
technology and military equipment to India had on their technical 
and sales staffs 1 arge numbers of South Asian e patriates 
especially Indians Northrop or Grumman could have mounted a Light 
Combat Aircra+t program for India entirely using Indian scientists 
and program managers Almost every member of every Indian 
delegation that came to the U S had close relatives or friends 
somewhere in the U S , and often in the corporations they were 
visiting
The second new factor was an ideological transformation in the 
structure of informed American political thinking about South Asia 
It is not welWnown or understood, especially in India, although it 
was fully reported on by Indian journalists, especially Bharat 
)arndad (Hindustan Times) and Dilip Mul erjee (Deccan Herald ) It 
was simply that the cliche— that Republicans favored Fakistan and 
Democrats favored India— no longer had any basis in fact The 
political consensus of the American left on India was weakened first 
by the Indian nuclear e> plosion of 1974, by the Emergency of l?-717- 
77, and also by the opening of China American liberals came to 
regard India as an ordinary countrv, worthy of support but hardi\ 
worthy of special considérât ion or praise
While many liberals were abandoning India some conservatives came to 
see it in a new light India was, after all, a major power it 
remained a democracy, and to many ideologically committed 
conservatives was preferable to the sti11 -communist Feople s 
Republic of China Further, some American conservât ives had 
established contact with a new generation of Indians not influenced 
by chronic left anti-Americanism There were very tew of these pr p -  
Indian conservatives, but they occupied ley positions in the 
executive and legislative branches and were critically important at 
certain moments But, they differed from some of their 1iberal
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predecessors in that they re-fused to abandon Fai- istan and the 
re+used to see American poi icy in South Asia as requiring a cnoice 
between Delhi and Islamabad
American Expectations
Turning to our central theme, what did the Reagan Administre*!: ion 
e pect from South Asia, and part ìcul ari y , what did it e pect from 
India0 There are three answers to this, because there were three 
major American regional objectives The first was the containment 
of Soviet power (for which there were few e pectations concerning 
India) the second the encouragement of Indian strategic autonomy 
(defined as a lessening of Indian dependence on the Soviet Union a 
goal which was only partially met) and the third the prevention of 
nuclear prol iteration (where India figured <*s a I ey player, albeit a 
somewhat disappointl-g one)
These three objectives were not equally pressing nor were the/ all 
adopted at the same time But all were discussed and adopted at the 
very highest levels of the U S government and al 1 , in one way or 
another, represented a departure from established policy When 
these three goals were pursued simultaneously— they posed one of the 
greatest challenges to the still and statecraft of policy maters in 
the Reagan administration, a challenge which has been largely— but 
again not entirely— met
Strategic Expectat i ons I Containment
The Soviet presence in Afghanistan was rightly seen as the major 
regional problem facing the U S  in 1981 America s historic policy 
of teeping major hostile powers out of South Asia was reactivated 1 
The Soviet occupation also had implications for the conduct of U5- 
Soviet relations elsewhere in the world and the future of the 
Eurasian balance of power
Ü
1 This was a policy which had historically led the US to align with the British 
against the Japanese, with Pakistan against a perceived Soviet threat (from 
19^4), and with India against China (from 1962)
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The Carter Administration had made some effort to taci up friend! \ 
states in the vicinity, especially Faiistan But the Reagan 
administration concluded that Fatistan was important for other 
reasons, as well The conservative Gulf Arab states were nervous 
about the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
and Fat istan had good ties with several of these states Iran itself 
was a pressing problem, but it could not be ignored again, Fat istan 
had retained good ties with Iran, despite the revolution In each 
case there were parallels between American and Fat istani interests 
(and in each case these mutual interests did not conflict with 
important Indian interests) Finally, in the eyes of some poiic\ 
maters Fat istan s close ties to the FRC meshed with our own 
strategic ties to Beijing, a case of our friend s friend being out" 
friend These relationships were seen entirely in Soviet ferms 
the idea that the US Fatistan, and China might have a common 
interest in containing India is a fiction invented in New Delhi (or 
perhaps, Moscow"') So, Pat istan had a fourfold importance tor 
American geo-strategic interests as a sympathetic player in the 
Gulf and Iran, as a friend of China, as key factor in Afghanistan, 
and as a possible target of further Soviet e pansion
India did not yet figure significanti y in these calculations If 
there were e pectations from India at this point they were that 
India would at least refrain from pressuring Fai-istan (India already 
had a substantial military lead over Fai istan, and was determined to 
maintain it despite increased American, Chinese, and Saudi support 
for Fafistan)
While India s behavior on tm s issue was proper its performance at 
the UN and its shrill attacks on modest American addition s to 
Islamabad s arsenals made it seem highly uni li el y to American policy 
maiers that it could become a positive factor in persuading the 
Soviets to withdraw from South Asia My own view is that the 
Indians had about the correct estimate of their limited influence 
vis a vis the Soviets, since they remained dependent upon Moscow for
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advanced milìtar/ hardware Ferhaps they, also did not believe the 
Soviets would pull out '.al though Indian officials all e pressed 
optimism that the/ would) and this contributed to their reiuctance 
to pressure the Soviets
Initially, some Fat istanis warned against a joint Soviet-Indian 
attack but Washinnton hc*s never quite accepted this argument 
«.although Operation Brass Tacts led to some late ninhts at the 
office) The American judgement was that india would not help much 
on Afghanistan, but that it would not be a serious hindrance to 
either the effort to counter the Soviet forces or Fat- istani and 
American diplomatic activities this judgement was based on a 
correct estimate of India s own vital interest in getting the 
Soviets out of the region
The broader poiicv of containing the Soviets by supporting Fat istan 
had three operational implications for U S -Indian relations
-The first was a continuing American effort to encourage 
India-Fat istan strategic, political, and economic cooperation This 
hortatory policy was not at first taten seriously by India since it 
was based on a concern for Fat istani, rather than Indian security 
Supplementing this was strong support for regional cooperative 
initiatives especially the South Asian Association for Regional 
Coopérât ion
-The second operational consequence was to reassure Fat-istan 
that the US was committed to assisting it against direct Soviet 
aggression While these assurances never fully satisfied Islamabad 
they were firm enough to make credible the prospect o+ American 
assistance in case of such an attack , and thus to mal e the Indians 
think twice before acceding to Soviet suggestions for a loint attack 
on Fak istan
-Third it became clear by 1982-3 that the India-Fak istan 
relationship could not be ignored nor would wishful pronouncements 
about India-Pak istan cooperation provide much incentive for New 
Delhi to undertake such cooperation The U S had to establish a 
dialogue with India— if only to protect its position with Pakistan,
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and this could be achieved only by e panding U S -Indian ties 
However, as American poi ic/ maters calculated the possible gains 
from closer relations with New Delhi, they also came to see other 
benefits from such a policy Thus was born a second major regional 
objective, the weaning of India from Soviet influence
Strateoic Expectations 11 A Relationship with India
SimultaneouslV , a similar calculation was probably being made in New 
Delhi Indian strategists must have reached the conclusion that the 
US-Fat istan tie could not be shaken unless India moved closer to 
Washington What was called the opening to India in Washington 
was probablv called the opening to Washington in Delhi
Both sides saw a long-term relationship as beneficial quite apart 
from short-term considérât ions of their respective relations with 
Fat istan Some Americans (especially among the conservatives) saw 
India as the emergent regional great power and an ideologically 
palatable alternative to the FRC No one that I tnow ot saw India 
as an alternative to Fatistan as long as the latter remained a 
front 1 m e  state (a term more often heard in Wasnington than 
Fat istan) There were some Indians who saw long-term benefits from 
a renewed American tie, especially in matters ot technology transfer 
and in dealing with the Soviets, when they showed signs of fading 
interest in Delhi
I am sure that neither side actually intended to switch alignments 
even after the successful Rajiv visit in June, 198er (India trading 
the Americans for Russians or the US trading Fa) istanis tor 
Indians) India was too dependent upon Moscow to contemplate much 
strategic movement and the US would never have abandoned Fa)istan 
in the face of severe Soviet pressure
Fa)istan s attitude towards these American efforts to promote better 
Indo-Fa) relations and to move closer to India itself were 
interesting Unlike any past Fa)istani leader Fresidenr Zia
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enthusiastically supported these steps He may have done so in the 
Inowledge that New Delhi was 1 11 el/ to remain recaicitrant, but ne 
had to overcome historic Fat istani -fears that the US would once 
again choose the 1 arger o-f the two South Asian states when it had 
the opportunity 1 Fat istanis are legitimately concerned about long­
term American support, but my judgement is that i^  has become an 
important enough state and has achieved such a degree o+ internal 
stability, that it will be a major factor in regional American 
policy for years to come, although that may not mean an e panded 
military relationship
Speculatively, the Russians may have been nervous about improved 
Indo-Soviet ties The Vladivostol speech of Gorbachev and his 
statements during a visit to New Delhi seemed to point to a lessened 
interest in India, but the Soviets have since provided significant 
new military technologies to India If for no other reason than 
this the Indian opening to Washington seems to have paid ot +
The basic American policy dilemma in attempting to wean India from 
Soviet influence was that advocates of this policy have not vet been 
able to shaie loose sufficient military equipment and advanced 
technology to mate the US a serious alternative to the Soviets 
Indeed, few had such hopes, and there were many policy maters who 
were perfectly aware that their efforts would only help India drive 
a better bargain with the Soviets That was not seen as harmful to 
American interests, per se, but there was lingering sadness that 
India had lost considerable policy autonomy, had become chronically 
anti-American in various internatlonal fora, and that the Soviets 
had obtained a foothold in India that no Indian government could
1 I think he was sincere ¿iá once proposed to Mrs Gandhi that India sell 
advanced military equipment to Pal istan Mrs Gandhi, probably astonished did 
not respond India s failure to take seriously most of Zia s gambits— even if
he was bluffing— may have been a tactical error
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eliminate, and that one dav might adverse! y affect «menean 
strategic interests 1
In the end, o+ course, it has been India that has benefited most 
significantly from the opening — whether Washington to bel hi or 
Delhi to Washington Had the opening not talen place it is doudtful 
whether Washington would have so uncritically baci-ed the Indo-Sri 
Lan*an agreement which virtually sanctions Indian regional and 
oceanic ambitions In fact, one suspects that it was Sri Lanka 
rather than Fakistan, that 1ater became the chief motive on the 
Indian side 2
Strategic Expectations III Proliferation
The Reagan administrât ion made three significant changes in «menean 
non-prolitérât ion policy in South Asia The first involved India 
the second Pakistan, the third a regional nuclear initiative I 
think more could be done, but the policy has been successful so tar 
in that neither state has an operational nuclear weapon and neither 
has conducted further nuclear tests 3
An earl 1er American refusal to provide fuel to the US-supplled 
reactor at Tarapur had crippled U S -Indian relations and certainly 
had no impact on the Indian or Fak istani military nuclear programs 
The former had paid the price already, the 1atter had a 
clandestine p _ am o+ significant scope which was based on the 
assumption that India already was a nuclear weapons state The
1 India has been used as a base for Soviet propaganda and disinformation with 
several world-wide anti-American campaigns originating there
2 And China might have been a factor as well The brief India-China border 
crisis of 1986-7 was certainly anticipated by India, which may have been testing 
the degree of support it would receive from both superpowers in case ot a 
confrontation with China— or trying to demonstrate India s importance to the 
Soviets, by threatening a crisis with China7 We may never know
3 I have discussed alternative arrangements in South Asia s Nuclear Arms Race
How the US Can Help Freeze It, Chicago Tribune , March 4 1988
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decision to allow the French to sell nuclear fuel to Tarapur removed 
significant obstacles in U S -Indian relations, but there were no 
American e pectahions beyond that The decision did anger Falistan, 
which could and did quite accuratel y claim that the US was being 
tougher on a friend, Fai-ist an than on India
The Reagan administration s second nonproliteration decision to 
link military sales to Islamabad s nuclear program, did create 
e pectations with regard to Fat ista m  behavior and indirectly 
Indian It was thought (and so tar, correctly so) that as long as 
Fat istan received American military equipment it would halt or 
restrain its nuclear program, slowing the pace of regional 
prol iteration I have no doubt in my mind that had the US pursued a 
tougher policy towards Fat istan then the latter would b\ now, be a 
nuclear military power My own view (in 1981 testimony) was that 
1int ing the military assistance package to Fat istani nuclear 
restraint would defer but not terminate Fat istan s nuclear 
ambitions H  there was a failure in policy it was to e plore and 
test this lint age, to see how much leverage the US had over the 
Fat istani nuclear program
It was probably due to the fear of putting heavy pressure on 
Falistan (and ríst ing the entire operation in Afghanistan) that led 
American policy to a third initiative, that of encouraging a 
regional nuclear agreement
This may have been doomed from the beginning because of the 
Administration s narrow definition of region India could— and 
did— claim that China was part of South Asia s nuclear system and 
that any regional agreement would have to include Beiung A truly 
regional agreement would also have to include the Soviets and might 
have to involve a joint declaration of South Asia as a nuclear tree 
zone A comprehensive, truly regional nuclear agreement might have 
stood a fifty-fifty chance of acceptance at least for a 11 ed 
period of time, but no such proposal was ever fully articulated
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btill, fhe limited American regional nuclear initiative did achie e 
some useful results It forced both India and Fat istan to thin) 
more carefully about their own nuclear plans and the prospect of an 
unrestrained nuclear arms race It may have contributed to those 
reqional nuclear agreements that have been reached, and it certainiv 
encouraged further public discussion of the nuclear ssue in inaia, 
and— surprisingly— in Fat-istan 1
Beyond Strateoy Other Issues
There were a number of other policy objectives in the Reagan 
administrât ion concerning India * Two are of particular interest 
but can be dealt with briefly
-For a number of years the Indian government has dismissed 
American concerns about terrorist acts, including hijacl- ings 
Indian leaders have conspicuously (and literally) embraced foreign 
political leaders who have advocated terrorism as an instrument of 
state policy In turn, the US was criticized as either not being 
sincere about terrorism, or was somehow responsible for terrorism 
against its own innocent civil lans and civil aircraft (through ifs 
support for Israel, Britain, and other governments under attac))
This line was followed for a wmle when India itself was subjected 
to terrorism, and wild allegations were made officially and
1 Until the issue was raised in a senes of visits oy Michael ttrmacost and 
others, almost all Pakistanis uncritically supported a military nuclear program 
Three years later (and in a much freer atmosphere) there is a range of debate 
and discussion in Fakistan which is bound to contribute to more sensible policy 
making
2 Our focus here is on India, and regional policies affecting India, but the 
major American effort to encourage the democratization of Pakistan must be 
noted American officials repeatedly and forcefully argued with Fresident ¿iá, 
Prime Minister Junejo, and other senior Pakistani officials that democrati ation 
was an important factor in the US-Pakistan relationship I think, the military 
would have moved to a more open system (and a less fundamentalist Islamic one) 
on their own, but American pressure certainly helped
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unot+iciall aoout American support for 1 haiistani secessionists 
and terrorists 1
Several years of very close government-to-government cooperation 
have ended such criticisms from responsible Indian authorities 
From an American perspective Indian polìcies towards terrorism are 
considerably more sensible These are subject to slippage however 
as when Rajiv hosted the Frime Minister of North F orea shortlv a+ter 
the murderous bombing of a I-AL plane But day-to-day cooperation 
remains e cel lent in bi-lateral matters, where both sides have much 
to gain by a close worl ing relationship
-Similarly, cooperation on combatting narcotics has been 
effective, after a slow start India ( 1 11- e Fai istan) was reluctant 
to wo™ closely with American narcotics e perts Both states ha e 
discovered, however, that access to American e pertise, technology, 
and intelligence capabilities are important in their own efforts to 
stem the growth and shipment of narcotics Both states al so 
concurred with the American proposal that narcotics (and terrorism) 
be added to the 1 ist of SAARC subjects
Summt no Up
Given that few e pected much concern for India in a conservât i ve 
Republican administration, that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
was the most important regional issue for the US (and an issue on 
which Indian policy was notoriously unhelpful, both publicly and 
privately), and given that Fat istani diplomacy proved to be 
e traordinary competent in pursuit of Pat istani (rather than 
American or Indian) interests, it is astonishing that American 
policy towards India turned out so well It was not perfect, there 
were mistates in judgement, timing, and implementation but by anv
1 Although the Indians had reason to De concerned about statements from benator 
Helms and others these were never taken seriously in the Executive branch, and 
soon ceased from Capitol Hill once pro-1 haiistani terrorism became widelv known 
and understood
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standard these poi ìcies advanced American interests Fai ìstani ones 
and at the very least, did not damage important Indian interests
Certainly the renewed US-Falistan tie was a political setbacl tor 
those segments of the Indian leadership that had hoped to achieve 
hegemony over Fai istan, but a vulnerable Fai istan dominated by the 
Soviet Union o^r the battleground between pro-Soviet, pro-Lhinese 
pro-Iranian and pro-Indian factions) would have been an Indian 
catastrophe And, although India has had to continue an arms race
with Pal istan it has been able to e tract modern weapons from the 
Soviets, very sophisticated dual-use technology from the Americans 
it has received superpower support for its operations in Sri Lanía, 
and it has still claimed that it is the aggrieved regional parw 
the victim of Chinese and superpower (especially American; 
machinations 1 In short, India has been able to have it both ways 
America might have preferred a different Indian response to some of 
its regional policies— a more serious dialogue with Fai istan on arms 
control issues greater responsiveness on certain high technology 
items, and as fie lble and as forgiving an attitude as New Delhi 
apparenti/ shows to the Soviet Union— but the absence of such Indian 
poiìcies did not threaten important American regional interests
1 am certain that things will be more difficult in the ne t tew 
years 2 a popular metaphor of American-Indian relations is that it 
has been a series of ups and downs over the years This is 
another worn-out cliche The real variable has been the dramatic 
engagement and disengagement of the US in South Asia over the years 
The 4<>s and ^Us saw a period of engagement after lS^ a long 
spell of disengagement, and there has been a revived American 
regional role since lQ8n During each period of American regional 
involvement some important Indian interests have been advanced a
* See Rajiv Gandhi s speech of February 3, 1988, for this curious combination of 
bellicosity and fearful ness
2 For a discussion of post-Afghanistan American policies see my Balancing 
Interests in South Asia, The National Interest October, 1987
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■few ma\ have been damaged The 1981-87 period was one in which 
significant Indian interests were accommodated by the US and India 
tool important steps to smooth out the relationship Both states 
were responding to a common regional event the agony of Afghanistan 
and the presence, in South Asia, of Soviet mil itary forces
But things are going to change An end to the occupation of
Afghanistan will not mean the end of crisis in Afghanistan, it will 
not mean that the advanced Indian and Faiistani nuclear programs 
will be shelved and it will not diminish the impact of the Iranian 
revolution on India and Faiistan The 1 iberal ization of the Chinese 
and Soviet systems— already responsible for serious unrest across 
South Asia s frontiers— will have new and st i ! 1 -unpredictabl e 
implications for both India and Fat istan FinalÌ > , domestic factors 
will increasingly shape foreign policy decisions in both states, 
further complicating their own relations and their ties ’■o the Ub
New policies and new strategies will be required to deal with these 
issues, but because most are primarily regional in nature we cannot 
e pect as active an American role We may yet loo! baci- upon the 
past seven >ears as— if not a Golden Age of US-Indian relations— at 
least an era of mostly sound policies, usua i y but not aiwci/s 
pursued for the right reasons
